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Has the International Olympic Committee 
Risen Above Corruption? 
BRIGIDA BENITEZ & JOHN LONDON†
INTRODUCTION 
International sports provide a fertile ground for corruption – 
billions of dollars in revenues at stake, competition among cities for 
hosting privileges that can result in substantial proceeds and 
resources, a lack of transparency in decision-making, and public 
officials in the midst of it all.  Rising above corruption can seem like 
a formidable feat. 
The investigations and resulting criminal proceedings and 
litigation related to alleged corruption perpetrated by executives at 
the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (“FIFA”) 
highlight the risk of corruption in international sports.  In May 2015, 
the United States indicted fourteen former FIFA officials with a 
variety of charges, including racketeering, money laundering, and 
wire fraud.1  After the indictment, an independent investigation 
conducted by FIFA’s counsel revealed a coordinated effort by three 
former top officials to corruptly enrich themselves with over 79 
million Swiss francs in the last five years using excessive salaries, 
World Cup bonuses, and other incentives.2   
© 2017 Brigida Benitez and John London. 
† Brigida Benitez is a partner at Steptoe & Johnson LLP in Washington, DC, where 
she focuses on global anti-corruption matters, internal investigations and complex business 
disputes.  John London is an associate at Steptoe & Johnson LLP in Washington, DC.
1. Office of Pub. Aff., Nine FIFA Officials and Five Corporate Executives Indicted for 
Racketeering Conspiracy and Corruption, DEPT. OF JUST. (May 27, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/nine-fifa-officials-and-five-corporate-executives-indicted-
racketeering-conspiracy-and. 
2. FIFA, Attorneys for FIFA Provide Update on Internal Investigation and Details on
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More recently, in November 2016, the former governor of Rio 
de Janeiro, was arrested on corruption charges for allegedly taking 
bribes in connection with public construction projects, including the 
renovation of the Maracanã Stadium before the 2014 FIFA World 
Cup and 2016 Olympic Games.3 
The opportunity for corruption within international sports 
organizations is hardly surprising: the amount of money generated by 
the largest sporting events can be staggering.  The 2014 World Cup 
in Brazil generated $4.8 billion in revenue for FIFA, with $2.2 billion 
in expenses.4  In addition, revenue and brand recognition can create 
bad incentives for corporate partners.  For example, two sports 
marketing companies associated with FIFA were convicted of 
criminal wrongdoing and agreed to forfeit over $190 million,5 and 
prosecutors reportedly are investigating subsidiaries of DirecTV and 
Fox for allegedly bribing soccer officials to acquire broadcast rights 
for soccer tournaments.6  Notably, however, FIFA is not the largest 
international sporting organization, nor is the World Cup the most 
recognizable recurring sporting event.   
The International Olympic Committee (“IOC”) describes the 
Olympic Games as the world’s biggest sporting event and the 
Olympic rings as one of the most widely recognized symbols in the 
world.7  Outlays to host the Olympic Games are enormous for the 
host cities, and revenues are on par or higher than those collected by 
FIFA.8  As noted in more detail below, the IOC has embarked on a 
number of reforms to increase its commitment to good governance 
Compensation for Former Top Officials, FIFA.COM (June 3, 2016), 
http://www.fifa.com/governance/news/y=2016/m=6/news=attorneys-for-fifa-provide-
update-on-internal-investigation-and-detail-2799851.html. 
3. Vinod Sreeharsha, Sergio Cabral, Ex-Governor of Rio de Janeiro, Arrested on
Corruption Charges, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/18/world/americas/sergio-cabral-rio-governor-
corruption.html.  
4. Tony Manfred, FIFA Made an Insane Amount of Money Off of Brazil’s $15 Billion
World Cup, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/fifa-brazil-
world-cup-revenue-2015-3. 
5. Office of Pub. Aff., Sixteen Additional FIFA Officials Indicted for Racketeering
Conspiracy and Corruption, DEPT. OF JUST. (Dec. 3, 2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/sixteen-additional-fifa-officials-indicted-racketeering-
conspiracy-and-corruption.   
6. See id.
7. Int’l Olympic Comm’n, 2015 Annual Report at 36 (Aug. 2, 2016),
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/Documents/IOC-
Annual-Report/IOC-Annual%20Report-2015.pdf. 
8. See id. at 128, 130 (noting that the 2013–2016 Olympiad produced $5.6 billion in
revenue and $1.374 billion was distributed to London for the 2012 Olympic Games). 
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and ethics, but corruption allegations still swirl around bids for the 
2016 and 2020 Summer Olympic Games.9  The IOC operates in an 
industry that presents risks for corruption, routinely deals with public 
officials, and often conducts its business in countries perceived to 
have high levels of corruption.  As such, the IOC is expected to 
maintain an effective compliance program to prevent and detect 
potential misconduct.   
This Article examines the IOC’s rules and procedures to 
determine their adequacy in addressing potential corruption.  To that 
end, we first explore the structure of the IOC and its history of 
corruption scandals.  The Article then focuses on the changes that the 
IOC has made over the years to its policies and procedures in an 
effort to address corruption risks.  We then describe international 
guidance for best practices in the design of a robust anti-corruption 
compliance program.  Finally, the Article examines potential gaps in 
the IOC’s policies and procedures that leave it vulnerable to 
corruption.   
I. THE INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE
A. Structure and Governance of IOC
The IOC is a Swiss non-profit non-governmental organization 
subject to suit by both member nations and individuals.10  It has been 
sued by both.  For example, Kuwait sued the IOC in Switzerland for 
one billion dollars in damages due to the suspension of its national 
Olympic teams,11 and U.S. Olympian Justin Reiter unsuccessfully 
sued the IOC in Switzerland to overturn its decision to remove 
Parallel Giant Slalom snowboarding racing from the Winter 
Olympics.12 
The IOC is the highest level of governance in international 
9. See Hugo Lowell, France Launches Corruption Investigation into Bid Processes for
2016 & 2020 Olympics, EURONEWS (Feb. 3, 2016), 
http://www.euronews.com/2016/03/02/ioc-says-no-evidence-of-corruption-in-olympic-
bidding-despite-new-french.  
10. Int’l Olympic Comm., Olympic Charter Rule 15 at 31 (effective  Aug. 2, 2016),
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/General/EN-
Olympic-Charter.pdf#_ga=1.48953187.415998738.1485096175. 
11. Kuwait Sues IOC for $1 Billion over Olympic Ban, REUTERS (June 23, 2016),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-olympics-kuwait-idUSKCN0Z91KI. 
12. Jason Blevins, Steamboat Olympian Justin Reiter Abandoning Lawsuit Against
IOC, DENV. POST (last updated Nov. 25, 2016), 
http://www.denverpost.com/2016/05/24/steamboat-olympian-justin-reiter-lawsuit-ioc/. 
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sports.  The IOC sets policies with respect to the Olympic Games, 
and two other groups of organizations are beneath it: National 
Olympic Committees (“NOC”) and International Sports Federations 
(“IF”).  The NOCs are responsible for fielding Olympic teams from 
each nation and determining which cities in their respective countries 
may apply to organize the Olympic Games.13  The IFs are non-
governmental organizations recognized by the IOC as the governing 
bodies for their respective sports.14  For example, FIFA is the IF 
responsible for the development of international soccer.15  IFs 
monitor and enforce the integrity of their respective sports, organize 
separate international events and competitions, and manage their 
events at the Olympic Games.16  The National Federations for 
individual sports are affiliated with the IFs.17  
The IOC is also responsible for working with the Organizing 
Committees for the Olympic Games (“OCOG”), which is organized 
and supervised by the NOC of the host country.  The OCOG is 
responsible for, among other things, building or updating facilities 
and venues for all competitions, acquiring lodging and adequate 
medical facilities for athletes, ensuring adequate transportation is 
available for the Olympic Games, and organizing cultural events and 
celebrations.18 
The highest body of the IOC is the Session, which is the general 
meeting of all IOC members.19  The Session meets once per year and 
is the only body entitled to select the host city for the Olympic 
Games.20  Decisions at the Session are made by majority vote, and 
half of the IOC members are required to be in attendance for 
13. Int’l Olympic Comm., Olympic Charter Rule 27 at 60 (effective Aug. 2, 2016),
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/General/EN-
Olympic-Charter.pdf#_ga=1.48953187.415998738.1485096175.   
14.  International Sports Federations, INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., 
https://www.olympic.org/ioc-governance-international-sports-federations (last visited Jan. 
22, 2017).   
15. FIFA, Who We Are, FIFA.COM, http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/who-we-
are/index.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2017). 
16.  International Sports Federations, INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., 
https://www.olympic.org/ioc-governance-international-sports-federations (last visited Jan. 
22, 2017). 
17. Id.
18. Organizing Committees for the Olympic Games, INT’L OLYMPIC COMM.,
https://www.olympic.org/ioc-governance-organising-committees (last visited Jan. 22, 2017). 
19. Int’l Olympic Comm., Olympic Charter Rule 18 at 42 (effective Aug. 2, 2016),
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/General/EN-
Olympic-Charter.pdf#_ga=1.48953187.415998738.1485096175. 
20. Id.
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quorum.21  IOC members are selected by current members through 
the Members Election Commission, previously the Nominations 
Commission. 22 The number of Members is capped at 115.23  Of the 
IOC members, fifteen are active athletes elected during the Olympic 
Games, fifteen are reserved for executives or senior leaders from IFs, 
and fifteen are reserved for executives or senior leaders from world 
or continental associations of the NOCs.24  IOC members are elected 
for a term of eight years with no limits on subsequent terms.25  If a 
member is elected after 1999, then there is an age limit of seventy 
years old.26 
General governance of the IOC is managed by the Executive 
Board, which consists of the President, four Vice Presidents, and ten 
general members.27  The Executive Board is elected by secret ballot at 
the Session to a four-year term.28  The Executive Board is responsible 
for management of the IOC’s finances, publication of the Annual 
Report, the internal rules and regulations of the IOC, decisions 
regarding the reelection of existing IOC members, and appointment 
of the IOC Director General.29   
21. Int’l Olympic Comm., Olympic Charter Rule 18.3 at 42–43 (effective Aug. 2,
2016), https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/General/EN-
Olympic-Charter.pdf#_ga=1.45768612.1479793253.1487346201. 
22. Int’l Olympic Comm., Olympic Charter Rule 16.2.3 at 38 – 39 (effective Aug. 2,
2016), https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/General/EN-
Olympic-Charter.pdf#_ga=1.45768612.1479793253.1487346201. 
23. Int’l Olympic Comm., Olympic Charter Rule 16.1.1 at 32 (effective Aug. 2, 2016),
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/General/EN-
Olympic-Charter.pdf#_ga=1.45768612.1479793253.1487346201. 
24 2015 Annual Report, supra note 7, at 68–69.  
25. Id. at 68
26. Int’l Olympic Comm., Olympic Charter Rules 16.3.3.1; 16.2.6.1 at 34; 40 (effective
Aug. 2, 2016), 
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/General/EN-
Olympic-Charter.pdf#_ga=1.48953187.415998738.1485096175. 
27. Int’l Olympic Comm., Olympic Charter Rule 19.1 at 45 (effective Aug. 2, 2016), 
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/General/EN-
Olympic-Charter.pdf#_ga=1.48953187.415998738.1485096175. 
28.  See IOC Executive Board, Int’l Olympic Comm., 
https://www.olympic.org/executive-board (last visited Jan. 22, 2017); see also Int’l Olympic 
Comm., Olympic Charter Rule 20.1 at 48 (effective Aug. 2, 2016), 
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/General/EN-
Olympic-Charter.pdf#_ga=1.48953187.415998738.1485096175 (stating the President has an 
eight-year term with a potential four-year extension). 
29.  See IOC Executive Board, Int’l Olympic Comm., 
https://www.olympic.org/executive-board; see also Int’l Olympic Committee, Olympic 
Charter Rule 19.3 at 45–46 (effective Aug. 2, 2016), 
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/General/EN-
Olympic-Charter.pdf#_ga=1.48953187.415998738.1485096175. 
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The IOC Director General is responsible for the administration 
of the IOC, under the authority of the President.30  The Director 
General is based in Lausanne, Switzerland and conducts the day-to-
day work of the IOC.31  The IOC had 521 full-time employees at the 
end of 2015 and runs a number of programs in collaboration with the 
United Nations meant to further develop international sport across 
different cultures.32 
B. Revenues and Expenditures of the IOC
The IOC generates revenue by promoting and hosting the 
Olympic Games.  During each cycle, called an Olympiad, the 
Olympic Games generate billions of dollars in revenue from a variety 
of sources.33  For example, projected revenue from the 2013–2016 
Olympiad was $5.6 billion.34  Broadcast rights for the Olympics 
accounted for 74% of total revenue during that time, while Olympic 
sponsorships generated an additional 18%.35  Olympic sponsorships 
are distributed through The Olympic Partners (“TOP”) program, 
which assigns sponsorships throughout the four-year period.36  
During the 2013–2016 cycle, the TOP program raised over one 
billion dollars.37  
The IOC distributes 90% of the revenue from the Olympics to 
its subsidiary organizations, including NOCs and IFs.38 The NOCs 
and IFs received $520 million respectively after the 2012 Summer 
Olympic Games in London.39  Moreover, a significant portion of the 
revenues are provided to the OCOG to defray costs associated with 
hosting the Olympic Games.  For instance, the IOC distributed 
$1.250 billion to Beijing for the 2008 Summer Olympics and $1.374 
billion to London for the 2012 Summer Olympic Games.40  The 
remaining ten percent of revenue is used to support IOC operations 
and fund IOC programs for the development and promotion of 
30. 2015 Annual Report, supra note 7, at 52.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 52, 97.
33. Id. at 126 – 129.
34. Id. at 128
35. Id.
36. Id.; see also The TOP Dogs of Olympic Sponsorship, ALL BUSINESS,
https://www.allbusiness.com/the-top-dogs-of-olympic-sponsorship-13903444-1.html. 
37. 2015 Annual Report, supra note 7, at 128.
38. Id. at129–31.
39. Id. at 130–31.
40. Id. at 130.
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international sport, which are administered by the Director General.41  
The cost of hosting the Olympic Games has risen dramatically in 
recent years, with Brazil estimated to have spent as much as $4.6 
billion for the 2016 Summer Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro.42  
Host cities have generally viewed the high economic and capital costs 
to host the Olympic Games as an opportunity to induce economic 
development and gain international recognition.  For instance, the 
IOC touted the establishment of Australia’s first large-scale urban 
water recycling system and the restoration of 160 hectares of “badly 
degraded land” in Sydney as long-term benefits from the 2000 
Summer Olympic Games.43  Given the increasingly high costs, 
however, a number of cities, including Rome and Boston, have 
withdrawn applications to host the 2024 Olympic Games, limiting the 
availability of host cities for future games.44  The IOC has sought to 
curb the increasing costs of the games, making sustainability one of 
the three pillars of the Olympic Agenda 2020.45 
C. Past Scandals and Corruption Risk
The selection of the host city is a crucial process for the IOC 
because the IOC generates all of its revenue by promoting, licensing 
and hosting the Olympic Games.  Thus, corruption in the process of 
selecting a host city and planning the games is a pernicious risk to the 
organization.  Scrutiny of corruption related to host-city bidding 
began after members of the Salt Lake City Olympic Organizing 
Committee were alleged to have paid IOC members to secure the 
rights to host the 2002 Winter Games.46  Those allegations arose in 
December 1998, after Marc Hodler—a long-serving IOC member 
41. Id. at 54, 129.
42. Clay Dillow, Hosting the Olympics is a Terrible Investment, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(Aug. 15, 2016, 11:35 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/hosting-the-olympics-is-a-
terrible-investment/.  
43. Int’l Olympic Comm., Sydney Still Reaping Benefits of Hosting Olympic Games
2000 (Aug. 20, 2016), https://www.olympic.org/news/sydney-still-reaping-benefits-of-
hosting-olympic-games-2000.  
44. See Andy Bull, Revised: The Biggest Threat to the Future of the Olympic Games,
GUARDIAN (July 27, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2016/jul/27/biggest-threat-
future-olympic-games-rio-2016-ioc-thomas-bach-hosts; Rome to Pull Out of Olympics 2024 
Bid on Cost Grounds, SKY NEWS (Sept. 22, 2016), http://news.sky.com/story/rome-set-to-
pull-out-of-olympics-2024-bid-on-cost-grounds-10586903; Hayden Bird, The Life and 
Death of Boston’s Olympic Bid, BOSTON.COM (Aug. 4, 2016), 
https://www.boston.com/sports/sports-news/2016/08/04/the-life-and-death-of-bostons-
olympic-bid.   
45. 2015 Annual Report, supra note 7, at 62.
46. See Thomas A. Hamilton, The Long Hard Fall from Mount Olympus: The 2002 Salt
Lake City Olympic Games Bribery Scandal, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 219, 221–24 (2010). 
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and lawyer in Switzerland—alleged that five to seven percent of the 
votes to select host cities were arranged by bribes through agents.47  
At roughly the same time, a Salt Lake City newspaper published a 
leaked document purporting to show that members of the city’s bid 
team created a scholarship fund for relatives of IOC members.48  As a 
result of an IOC investigation, ten members were expelled or 
resigned and ten members were sanctioned.49  The IOC declined to 
sanction members of the Salt Lake Organizing Committee because it 
punished the responsible IOC Members.50  However, in July 2000, 
U.S. prosecutors indicted the former President and Vice President of 
the Organizing Committee for allegedly offering and paying one 
million dollars to influence the votes of more than a dozen IOC 
members and falsifying the books of the Organizing Committee to 
hide the conduct.51  Neither was convicted.52    
Further investigation of the Salt Lake City allegations by the 
IOC led to the revelation that corruption in the selection and bidding 
process was widespread, and potentially had been so for decades.53  
For example, reports stated that an Australian official paid $70,000 
for the votes of two African IOC Members, which resulted in the 
award of the 2000 Summer Olympic Games to Sydney,54 and Richard 
Pound, the Vice President responsible for investigating misconduct 
related to the Salt Lake City bid, stated that he previously had been 
47. See Stephen Wilson, Olympic Corruption Whistleblower Dies, WASH. POST (Oct.
18, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/10/18/AR2006101800310_pf.html. 
48. Id.
49. See Lisa Riley Roche, IOC Members May Still Face Sanctions, DESERET NEWS
(Aug. 24, 2001), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/860292/IOC-member-may-still-face-
sanctions.html?pg=all.  One of the  members passed away.  See Thomas A. Hamilton, The 
Long Hard Fall from Mount Olympus: The 2002 Salt Lake City Olympic Games Bribery 
Scandal, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 219, 224 (2010). 
50. See Jere Longman, Olympics; 2 Officials Quit in Salt Lake City As Olympic Scandal
Details Grow, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 1999), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/01/09/sports/olympics-2-officials-quit-in-salt-lake-city-as-
olympic-scandal-details-grow.html. 
51. Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Former Officials of Salt Lake City Olympic
Organizing Committee Indicted for Roles in Olympic Site Selection (July 20, 2000), 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2000/July/413crm.htm. 
52. See Lex Hemphill, Olympics; Acquittals End Bid Scandal that Dogged Winter
Games, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/06/sports/olympics-
acquittals-end-bid-scandal-that-dogged-winter-games.html. 
53. See Marc Fisher & Bill Brubaker, Privileged World of IOC’s Members Under
Scrutiny, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 1999), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/digest/daily/jan99/ioc23.htm; Kieran Daley, Olympic Games: IOC Report Shows 
“Decades of Bribery”, INDEP. (Jan. 20, 1999), http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/olympic-
games-ioc-report-shows-decades-of-bribery-1075358.html.  
54. See Fisher & Brubaker, supra note 53.
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offered a one million dollar bribe from a foreign TV network in 
exchange for favorable contract terms.55  Reports stated that an 
internal investigation of the IOC bidding procedures found that, in 
certain circumstances, gifts to IOC members were not reasonable, 
ordinary or routine, and included gifts such as medical services, 
college scholarships, jobs, airline tickets, hotel accommodations, and 
cash.56   
II. IOC ANTI-CORRUPTION COMPLIANCE PROGRAM
Following reports of corruption related to Salt Lake City’s bid
for the Winter Olympics, the IOC implemented a number of reforms 
that altered the composition, structure and organization of the IOC 
and addressed some deficiencies in the designation of the host city 
for the Olympic Games.57  As to membership, the IOC implemented 
an age limit of seventy for members, restricted the total number of 
members to 115, and created the Nominations Commission (later the 
Members Election Commission) to add transparency to the process of 
selecting candidates and electing members.58  The IOC also 
implemented a number of recommendations meant to improve 
transparency regarding the disbursement of finances, including the 
disclosure of all allocations of funds to NOCs and IFs and a 
requirement that all candidate cities disclose sources of funding for 
bid expenditures for the purpose of conducting audits.59  In addition, 
when signing a contract with the host city, the IOC requires that the 
host city, host NOC, and OCOG abide by internationally recognized 
anti-corruption standards by establishing and maintaining an effective 
compliance program.60 
55. Steven Pearlstein, Evidence of Corruption “Irrefutable,” IOC Official Says, WASH.
POST (Jan. 21, 1999), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/digest/daily/jan99/oly21.htm.  
56. See A. Craig Copetas & Roger Thurow, Salt Lake Scandal Draft Report is Certain
to Upset the IOC, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 20, 1999), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB916784416903326000. 
57. See Richard Sandomir, Olympics; I.O.C. Push for Reform Seeks Rules on Bribery,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/01/sports/olympics-ioc-push-
for-reform-seeks-rules-on-bribery.html; Int’l Olympic Comm., Report by the IOC 2000 
Comm’n to the 110th IOC Session 1 (Dec. 1999), 
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/IOC/Who-We-
Are/Commissions/IOC-2000-Reform-Follow-up/EN-110th-IOC-Session-Report-by-the-
IOC-2000-Commission-December-1999.pdf.  
58. See Int’l Olympic Comm., supra note 57, at 3–5.
59. See id. at 26.
60. Int’l Olympic Comm., Host City Contract 2024 – Principles, 15.2 (Sept. 2015)
https://stillmed.olympic.org/Documents/Host_city_elections/Host_City_Contract_Principles.
pdf.   
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In 1999, the IOC amended the Olympic Charter to create the 
Ethics Commission, which is responsible for conducting 
investigations into breaches of ethics and recommending disciplinary 
measures or sanctions to the Executive Board.61  The Ethics 
Commission is responsible for publishing and updating the IOC Code 
of Ethics, which binds the IOC members, NOCs, IFs, and OCOGs to 
“act with the highest degree of integrity” and with “impartiality, 
objectivity, independence and professionalism.”62  According to the 
Code of Ethics, “Olympic parties,” including IOC members, must 
not, directly or indirectly, “solicit, accept or offer any form of 
remuneration or commission, nor any concealed benefit or service of 
any nature, connected with the Olympic Games.”63  The only 
exception is that members may take “tokens of consideration or 
friendship of nominal value, in accordance with prevailing local 
customs.”64   
The IOC has continued to modify and supplement its 
compliance program over the years.  In 2013, the IOC adopted the 
Universal Principles of Good Governance, emphasizing transparency, 
particularly with regard to the IOC’s finances.65  Notably, the IOC 
must now maintain an internal controls system to establish “control 
of the financial processes and operations” within the organization, 
including a “compliance system, document retention system and 
information security system.”66  Moreover, in 2014, the IOC adopted 
the Olympic Agenda 2020, which suggested forty recommendations 
meant to, among other things, strengthen the IOC commitment to 
good governance, transparency and ethics.67  Pursuant to those 
61. See Int’l Olympic Comm., Ethics Comm’n (last visited Jan. 22, 2017),
https://www.olympic.org/ethics-commission; Int’l Olympic Comm., Olympic Charter, Rule 
22 (effective Aug. 2, 2016), 
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/General/EN-
Olympic-Charter.pdf#_ga=1.48953187.415998738.1485096175. 
62.  See Int’l Olympic Comm., Code of Ethics 11, 14 (2016), 
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/Documents/Code-of-
Ethics/2016/Book-Code-of-Ethics-2016.pdf#_ga=1.47959138.415998738.1485096175. 
63. Id at 14.
64. Id.
65. See Int’l Olympic Comm., Good Governance, https://www.olympic.org/good-
governance (last visited Jan. 22, 2017).  
66. Int’l Olympic Comm., supra note 62, at 69.
67. See Int’l Olympic Comm., Olympic Agenda 2020: 20+20 Recommendations
(2014), 
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/Documents/Olympic
-Agenda-2020/Olympic-Agenda-2020-20-20-
Recommendations.pdf#_ga=1.48429027.415998738.1485096175; see also Int’l Olympic
Comm., IOC Annual Report: Credibility, Sustainability and Youth (2015),
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/Documents/IOC-
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recommendations, the IOC publishes an annual report of its financial 
statements and has its financial statements audited in accordance with 
the International Financial Reporting Standards.68   
Implementation of the Olympic Agenda 2020 began in earnest 
in 2015.  At that time, the IOC bolstered the independence of the 
Ethics Commission by having its members elected by the Session 
(rather than appointed by the Executive Board), revised existing 
ethics policies, launched an integrity and compliance hotline, and 
created the Ethics and Compliance Office to conduct independent 
investigations of suspected wrongdoing and provide education, 
information, and confidential advice to Olympic personnel regarding 
the ethical principles and rules.69  Notably, the IOC revised conflict of 
interest rules to require IOC members with a potential conflict of 
interest—including the interests of a parent, spouse, relation or 
dependent—from “accepting any form of benefit whatsoever” and 
directing the IOC member to consult with the Chief Ethics and 
Compliance Officer.70 
Finally, the IOC implemented a number of changes in the 
process by which candidate cities submit bids to host the Olympic 
Games.71  Most important, the IOC President now selects an 
Evaluation Commission to evaluate bids from candidate cities and to 
conduct site visits.72  The Evaluation Commission Working Group 
then publishes an open report to the Executive Board summarizing 
the contents of the bids and making transparent recommendations 
based on a pre-approved matrix.73  IOC members who are not on the 
Evaluation Commission are prohibited from visiting candidate cities, 
and the candidate cities are prohibited from hosting sporting events at 
which large numbers of IOC members would participate.74   
During the bidding process, the IOC prohibits an IOC member 
Annual-Report/IOC-Annual%20Report-2015.pdf#_ga=1.82040787.415998738.1485096175. 
68. See Int’l Olympic Comm. Olympic Agenda 2020: 20+20 Recommendations, at 21
(2014).  
69.  See Int’l Olympic Comm., Ethics Commission (Jan. 22, 2017), 
https://www.olympic.org/ethics-commission. 
70. See Int’l Olympic Comm., supra note 62, at 30, 31 (2016).
71. INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., Olympic Agenda 2020, supra note 68 at 3, 9–11.
72. See Int’l Olympic Comm., Evaluation Commission (Jan. 22, 2017),
https://www.olympic.org/evaluation-commission.  
73. See Int’l Olympic Comm., Games of the XXXII Olympiad 2020 Working Group
Report, (Apr. 5, 2012), https://stillmed.olympic.org/Documents/Host_city_elections/Final-
report-2020-Working-Group-English.pdf. 
74. Int’l Olympic Comm., supra note 62, at 35, 40.
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from receiving any gift, of any value, from a candidate city.75  
Candidate cities are allowed to promote their bids to IOC members, 
but only during international events or competitions or through 
written documentation.76  Moreover, promotion cannot be undertaken 
by third parties.77  Further, the IOC requires that the candidate city 
and associated NOC declare and register all consultants, individuals 
or companies that are participating in or supporting the city’s 
candidacy to the IOC.78   
Most recently, the IOC entered into a contract with Los Angeles 
and the U.S. NOC related to the 2028 Summer Olympics that 
contains, for the first time, a provision prohibiting fraud or corruption 
on the part of the host city, NOC, or Organizing Committee with 
respect to their activities organizing the Olympic games, including 
“by establishing and maintaining effective reporting and 
compliance.”79 
The IOC has undoubtedly made many positive changes to its 
anti-corruption program in the last fifteen-years in response to the 
corruption risks it has confronted.  To examine the effectiveness of 
these changes – and any gaps that remain in the IOC’s policies and 
procedures – it is useful to step back and consider internationally 
accepted best practices for anti-corruption compliance programs.  We 
can then assess the IOC’s program through the prism of those best 
practices. 
III. ELEMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE PROGRAM
There are a number of international standards available setting
forth best practices for corporate anti-bribery and corruption 
programs, including guidance published by the OECD and 
75. Id. at 41.
76. Id. at 40.
77. Id. at 38.
78. Id. at 36.
79. INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., Host City Contract Principles: Games of the XXXIV
Olympiad – Candidature Process 2028, (July 2017), 
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/Documents/Host-
City-Elections/XXXIV-Olympiad-2028/Host-City-Contract-2028-
Principles.pdf#_ga=2.166505593.696523938.1501602803-1756006933.1453748726; Andy 
Spalding, The Olympic Anti-Corruption Era Begins, THE FCPA BLOG (Aug. 1, 2017), http://
www.fcpablog.com/blog/2017/8/1/andy-spalding-the-olympic-anti-corruption-era-
begins.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+fcpab
log%2FsLbh+%28The+FCPA+Blog%29.  
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International Standards Organizations.80  Further, the United States 
and United Kingdom have both offered guidance regarding the best 
practices for an anti-bribery and corruption compliance program.81   
International authorities have tended to converge on the basic 
elements of an effective compliance program, such as the one that the 
IOC would be advised to continue to build as a result of its past 
experiences with corruption in the bidding process.  The following 
are some of the hallmarks of an effective anti-corruption compliance 
program, focusing on those elements that would be most relevant to 
the IOC, and using U.S. enforcement authorities as a guidepost. 
A. Commitment from Senior Management
Compliance begins with senior leaders setting a proper tone and 
creating a “compliance culture.”82  In assessing the effectiveness of a 
compliance program, U.S. enforcement authorities evaluate the extent 
to which senior management has “clearly articulated company 
standards, communicated them in unambiguous terms, adhered to 
them scrupulously, and disseminated them throughout the 
organization.”83  Commitment from senior management is necessary 
to transform a strong paper compliance program into an effective tool 
to fight corruption.  Strong commitment from senior management 
encourages middle management to reinforce the message, expanding 
80. See generally Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics, and
Compliance, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (Feb.18, 2010), 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/44884389.pdf; ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery 
Management Systems — Requirements with Guidance for Use, Int’l Organization for 
Standardization (2016), https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:37001:ed-1:v1:en.   
81. See generally DEP’T OF JUST. & SEC. & EXCH. COMM., A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE
U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2012) [hereinafter FCPA Resource Guide]; U.S. 
SENT’G COMM., FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2012); see also MINISTRY OF 
JUST., THE BRIBERY ACT 2010 (2011).   
82. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 57; see also MINISTRY OF JUST., THE 
BRIBERY ACT 2010: Guidance § 2.1 (2010) (calling for “top-level management” to “foster a 
culture” in which “bribery is never acceptable”); THE WORLD BANK, SUMMARY OF WORLD 
BANK GROUP INTEGRITY COMPLIANCE GUIDELINES § 2.1 (2010); ISO 37001:2016 ANTI-
BRIBERY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS — REQUIREMENTS WITH GUIDANCE FOR USE § A.3.1, INT’L 
ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION (2016); DEPT. OF JUST., THE FRAUD SECTION’S 
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ENFORCEMENT PLAN AND GUIDANCE 7 (2016) (stating a 
company must have “established culture of compliance, including awareness among 
employees that any criminal conduct, including the conduct underlying the investigation, 
will not be tolerated”). 
83. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 57; see also ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery
Management Systems — Requirements with Guidance for Use §§ 5.1.2(d)–(e), (h)–(k), Int’l 
Organization for Standardization (2016); Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act 2010: 
Guidance § 2.2 (2010).   
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the reach and influence of compliance programs and staff.84  
Alternatively, weak leadership (including explicit or implicit 
messages to engage in or overlook misconduct to achieve sales or 
business objectives) undermines the effectiveness of compliance 
programs and may subject a company to criminal liability.85  
B. Code of Conduct
A code of conduct is viewed as a foundational element of an 
effective compliance program.86  Effective codes are clear, concise, 
and accessible to all employees of the company and any third parties 
that do business on the company’s behalf.87  U.S. enforcement 
authorities emphasize that the code of conduct should be available in 
the local languages of any employees working in foreign countries, 
and an organization should periodically reviews its code of conduct 
to ensure that it is current and effective.88 
U.S. enforcement authorities also evaluate whether a company 
has policies and procedures that outline compliance responsibilities in 
the company; establish appropriate internal controls, auditing 
practices, and documentation policies; and set forth disciplinary 
procedures in the event of a violation.89  Specific policies and 
procedures should be tailored to take into account a company’s 
business model, the size of the business, and risks associated with the 
business.90  To be effective, the policies and procedures must be 
84. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 57.
85. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8B2.1(b)(2)(A) (setting forth the
“minim[um] require[ments]” for governing authorities and high-level personnel in 
“promoti[ng] an organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a culture of 
compliance with law”); Dept. of Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business 
Organizations, U.S. Attorney’s Manual §9-28.800 (2015).  
86. FCPA Resource Guide,  supra note 81, at 57; see also ISO 37001:2016 Anti-
Bribery Management Systems — Requirements with Guidance for Use § 4.3, Int’l 
Organization for Standardization (2016). 
87. See FCPA Resource Guide,  supra note 81, at 57; see also Ministry of Justice, The
Bribery Act 2010: Guidance, Principle 1 and § 1.1 (2010); Ministry of Justice, The Bribery 
Act 2010: Guidance § 2.2 (2010); Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics, and 
Compliance § 2, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (Feb.18, 2010); 
ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management Systems — Requirements with Guidance for 
Use §§ 5.2, 8.5, Int’l Organization for Standardization (2016).  
88. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 57–58; ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery
Management Systems — Requirements with Guidance for Use §§ 5.2, 7.4, Int’l 
Organization for Standardization (2016). 
89. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 58; see also Ministry of Justice, The
Bribery Act 2010: Guidance §§ 1.6, 1.7 (2010); ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management 
Systems — Requirements with Guidance for Use §§ 5.2, 7.2.2.1, 7.5, 8.3, 8.4, A.11, A.12, 
Int’l Organization for Standardization (2016). 
90. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 58; see also Ministry of Justice, The
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developed based on an “in-depth understanding of the company’s 
business model, including its products and services, third-party 
agents, customers, government interactions, and industry and 
geographic risks.”91   
C. Oversight, Autonomy and Resources of Compliance
Program
It is important for those charged with leading the compliance 
effort to have the necessary autonomy and resources to carry out their 
duties.  Enforcement authorities often evaluate whether a company 
has assigned responsibility for the oversight and implementation of 
the program to one or more specific senior executives within an 
organization92 and whether those individuals have appropriate 
authority within the organization, adequate autonomy from 
management, and sufficient staffing and resources to ensure that the 
compliance program is implemented.93  Adequate autonomy usually 
requires that the compliance officer be given direct access to a 
company’s governing authority, such as the board or audit 
committee.94     
The sufficiency of compliance resources is often measured 
based on the size, structure, and risk profile of a company (including, 
among other things, its complexity, industry, and geographical 
reach).95  Enforcement authorities may evaluate other control 
functions, such as Legal, Finance, and Audit, against these 
Bribery Act 2010: Guidance §§ 1.3, 1.7 (2010); ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management 
Systems — Requirements with Guidance for Use § 4.3, Int’l Organization for 
Standardization (2016). 
91. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 58.
92. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 58; ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery
Management Systems — Requirements with Guidance for Use § 5.3.2, Int’l Organization for 
Standardization (2016); Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics, and 
Compliance § 4, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (Feb.18, 2010); 
The World Bank, Summary of World Bank Group Integrity Compliance Guidelines § 2.3 
(2010).   
93. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 58  (citing U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
§ 8B2.1(2)(B)-(C) (2011)).
94. See id.; ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management Systems — Requirements with
Guidance for Use §§ 5.3.2, A.6.2, A.6.3,  Int’l Organization for Standardization (2016); 
Dept. of Justice, The Fraud Section’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement Plan and 
Guidance 7 (2016). 
95. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 58.; Ministry of Justice, The Bribery
Act 2010: Guidance § 3.3 (2010); ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management Systems — 
Requirements with Guidance for Use §§ 5.1.1(c)–(d), 7.1, A.6.1, A.7, Int’l Organization for 
Standardization (2016); Dept. of Justice, The Fraud Section’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
Enforcement Plan and Guidance 7 (2016).   
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requirements as well.96  Further, enforcement authorities recognize 
that the compliance reporting structure may appropriately vary 
depending on the size and complexity of the organization.97  For 
instance, in larger organizations, it may be necessary to delegate day-
to-day operational responsibilities for the compliance program to 
other individuals. 
Often, companies found to have engaged in corruption create 
new or enhanced compliance resources to prevent future misconduct.  
For example, in 2008, Siemens entered into a plea agreement with the 
U.S. Department of Justice related to serious violations of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) spanning its global operations.98  In 
accepting a plea, the U.S. government noted Siemens’ 
“extraordinary” reorganization and remediation efforts that “set a 
high standard for multi-national companies to follow.”99  Among 
other measures, Siemens consolidated its compliance organization 
under a new position, the Chief Compliance Officer, who reported 
directly to the CEO and General Counsel, a structure that has since 
become increasingly common.100  Siemens also required that every 
member of its 450-person audit staff reapply for their positions to 
ensure that auditing personnel were competent.101   
D. Risk Assessments
Risk assessments are essential to an effective compliance 
program: the design of internal controls in a company must take into 
account the operational realities and risks of a company’s business.  
When evaluating a compliance program, enforcement authorities 
consider whether and to what degree a company analyzes and 
addresses its particular risks.102  Companies are expected to increase 
96. See Dept. of Justice, Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs 2–3 (2017);
ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management Systems — Requirements with Guidance for 
Use §§ 8.10(c)–(d), 9.2.4,  Int’l Organization for Standardization (2016).   
97. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 58.
98. See Dep’t. Sentencing Memorandum at 3–10, United States v. Siemens
Aktiengesellschaft  (D.C. Cir. Dec. 12, 2008) (No. 08-cr-00367). 
99. See id. at 14, 24
100. Id. at 22.
101. See Dep’t. Sentencing Memorandum at 22, United States v. Siemens
Aktiengesellschaft (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008) (No. 08-cr-367). 
102. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 40, 58; Dept. of Justice, The Fraud
Section’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement Plan and Guidance 7 (2016); Dept. of 
Justice, Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs 4–5 (2017); Ministry of Justice, The 
Bribery Act 2010: Guidance §§ 3.1, 3.5 (2010); The World Bank, Summary of World Bank 
Group Integrity Compliance Guidelines § 3 (2010); ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery 
Management Systems — Requirements with Guidance for Use §§ 4.5, A.4, Int’l 
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their compliance procedures and resources—including in areas such 
as due diligence or internal audits—as appropriate to meet the types 
and level of risks they face.103   
It is important to tailor a compliance program.  One-size-fits-all 
compliance programs are not effective and, often, limited compliance 
resources are wasted on low-risk markets and transactions, while 
insufficient resources are dedicated to higher-risk areas.  The U.S. 
Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
give “meaningful credit” to risk-based programs that fail to prevent 
an infraction in a low-risk area because resources were directed to 
higher-risk transactions.104  Alternatively, companies are more 
culpable where a violation occurs because a company failed to 
“perform a level of due diligence commensurate with the size and 
risk of the transaction.”105  
E. Training and Continuing Advice
Effective compliance programs must be communicated 
throughout an organization, including risk-based periodic training 
and certification for all directors, officers, “relevant” employees, and, 
when appropriate, agents and business partners.106  Trainings should 
cover compliance policies and procedures, instruction on applicable 
law, practical advice, and case studies.107  The content also should be 
tailored for the intended audience, and U.S. enforcement authorities 
suggest providing training in local languages and adjusting the 
training content to address the different risks that personnel are likely 
to encounter.108  Depending on their size, companies should also 
Organization for Standardization (2016). 
103. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 59; Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act
2010: Guidance § 4.5 (2010); ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management Systems — 
Requirements with Guidance for Use § 8.2, Int’l Organization for Standardization (2016). 
104. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 59.
105. Id.
106. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 59; Dept. of Justice, Evaluation of
Corporate Compliance Programs 4–5 (2017) (asking, among other things, whether “there 
has been clear guidance and/or training for the key gatekeepers . . . in control processes 
relevant to the potential misconduct”); Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act 2010: Guidance 
§§ 1.7, 5.1, 5.6–5.8 (2010); Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics, and
Compliance §§ 8, 11(i), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (Feb.18,
2010); ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management Systems — Requirements with Guidance
for Use § 7.3, Int’l Organization for Standardization (2016).
107. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 59; Ministry of Justice, The Bribery
Act 2010: Guidance § 5.5 (2010); ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management Systems — 
Requirements with Guidance for Use §§ 7.3, 8.9, Int’l Organization for Standardization 
(2016).  
108. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 59; Dept. of Justice, Evaluation of
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implement “appropriate measures” to provide guidance and advice on 
complying with the company’s compliance program, including when 
such advice is urgent.109 
F. Incentives and Disciplinary Measures
Enforcement authorities underline the importance of enforcing 
compliance requirements in an organization and incentivizing 
compliant behavior, specifically, whether a company has appropriate 
and clear disciplinary policies that apply equally to all employees; 
whether the procedures are applied fairly, consistently, and promptly, 
including against managers who supervise employees who violate 
company policy; and whether the punishments are commensurate 
with the violation.110  
Compliance programs also should create positive incentives for 
ethical behavior, while taking care to ensure that rewards do not 
create unintended negative consequences.111  U.S. enforcement 
authorities encourage companies to highlight compliance within their 
organizations and to consider ethics and compliance in promotion, 
compensation, and evaluation decisions.112 
G. Third-Party Due Diligence and Payments
Agents, consultants, distributors, and other third parties are 
commonly used as conduits for improper payments.  Under the 
FCPA, for example, knowledge includes more than actual knowledge 
of wrongdoing: a person has knowledge if he or she consciously 
avoids actual knowledge.113  U.S. enforcement authorities believe that 
knowledge includes willful blindness to any “‘signaling device’ that 
should reasonably alert [a company] of the ‘high probability’ of an 
Corporate Compliance Programs 5 (2017). 
109. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 59; ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery
Management Systems — Requirements with Guidance for Use §§ 8.9, A.2.2.3, Int’l 
Organization for Standardization (2016) (providing potential guidance when personnel face 
improper requests). 
110. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 59; Dept. of Justice, Evaluation of
Corporate Compliance Programs 6 (2017); Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, 
Ethics, and Compliance § 10, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(Feb.18, 2010).  
111. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 59–60; Dept. of Justice, Evaluation of
Corporate Compliance Programs 6 (2017); Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, 
Ethics, and Compliance § 9, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(Feb.18, 2010); ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management Systems — Requirements with 
Guidance for Use §§ 7.2.2.2, A.8.2, Int’l Organization for Standardization (2016).   
112. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 59-60.
113. See United States v. Kozeny, 667 F.3d 122, 132 (2d Cir. 2011).
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FCPA violation.”114  As a result of this heightened “knowledge” 
standard under the FCPA, risk-based third-party due diligence is 
considered an essential hallmark of an effective anti-corruption 
compliance program, and companies are expected to respond to any 
red flags that arise, whether as part of pre-engagement due diligence 
or throughout the relationship.115     
While U.S. enforcement authorities recognize that due diligence 
should take into account the industry, country, length of relationship 
with the third party, and the size and nature of the transaction, they 
also define three general avenues of inquiry that “always apply.”116  
First, companies must understand the qualifications and associations 
of the third party, including its business reputation and 
relationships.117  The degree of scrutiny should increase if a company 
becomes aware of red flags.118     
Second, companies must understand the business rationale for 
incorporating third parties into a transaction.119  Companies should 
compare the payment terms for the third party to typical terms in the 
industry and country, check the timing and source of the third party’s 
introduction to the transaction, and confirm and document that the 
third party is actually performing work and that the pay is 
commensurate with the work.120   
114. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 22 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 100-576, at
922). 
115. See id. at 23; Dept. of Justice, Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs 7
(2017); Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act 2010: Guidance §§ 4.3–4.5 (2010); ISO 
37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management Systems — Requirements with Guidance for Use §§ 
8.2, A.10, Int’l Organization for Standardization (2016); The World Bank, Summary of 
World Bank Group Integrity Compliance Guidelines § 5.1 (2010); Good Practice Guidance 
on Internal Controls, Ethics, and Compliance § 6(i), Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (Feb.18, 2010). The SEC and DOJ provide a non-exhaustive list 
of examples of common “red flags” in third-party transactions: (1) excessive commissions to 
agents or consultants; (2) unreasonably large discounts to distributors; (3) “consulting 
agreements” with vaguely defined services; (4) third parties unqualified for the work in 
which they have been engaged; (5) third parties with close relationships to foreign officials; 
(6) third-parties that enter the transaction at the request of a foreign official; (7) shell
companies operating as third-parties; and (8) third-party requests to use offshore bank
accounts. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 22–23.
116. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 60.
117. Id.; see also Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act 2010: Guidance § 4.5 (2010); ISO
37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management Systems — Requirements with Guidance for Use §§ 
A.10.3(a)(2), A.12(a), Int’l Organization for Standardization (2016).
118. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 60.
119. Id.; see also ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management Systems — Requirements
with Guidance for Use §§ A.10.3(a), A.12(b), Int’l Organization for Standardization (2016). 
120. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 60; Dept. of Justice, Evaluation of
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Third, companies should conduct ongoing monitoring of third 
parties.121  Depending on the level of risk, companies should update 
due diligence periodically, exercise audit rights, and provide periodic 
training to third parties.122  Third parties should be made aware of the 
company’s anti-corruption policies, and may submit annual 
compliance certifications assuring the company of a reciprocal 
commitment to ethical and lawful business practices.123  
H. Confidential Reporting and Internal Investigations
An effective compliance program provides a secure, confidential 
and accessible means for employees to report suspected or actual 
violations of the company’s policies, provide suggestions for 
improvement of a company’s anti-corruption procedures, and request 
advice.124  The compliance function should have complete access to 
all reporting and investigative information,125 and, in all cases, 
employees should be able to use the systems without fear of 
retaliation.126   
Companies must also create an efficient, reliable and properly 
funded process to undertake reasonably scoped investigations of 
Corporate Compliance Programs 7 (2017) (asking about the “business rationale for the use 
of the third parties” and how the company ensured “that the payment terms are appropriate, 
that the described contractual work is performed, and that compensation is commensurate 
with the services rendered”). 
121. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 60; see also ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery
Management Systems — Requirements with Guidance for Use § 8.2, Int’l Organization for 
Standardization (2016). 
122. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 60.
123. Id. at 60–61; see also Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act 2010: Guidance § 5.7
(2010); ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management Systems — Requirements with 
Guidance for Use §§ 7.3, A.10(e), Int’l Organization for Standardization (2016). 
124. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 61; Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act
2010: Guidance § 5.3 (2010); Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics, and 
Compliance § 11.1(ii), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (Feb.18, 
2010); ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management Systems — Requirements with Guidance 
for Use § 8.9(a)–(c), Int’l Organization for Standardization (2016). 
125. See Dept. of Justice, Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs 5 (2017); ISO
37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management Systems — Requirements with Guidance for Use § 
A.18.2, Int’l Organization for Standardization (2016).
126. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 61; Ministry of Justice, The Bribery
Act 2010: Guidance §§ 2.3, 5.3 (2010); ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management Systems 
— Requirements with Guidance for Use §§ 5.2.1(1), 7.2.2.1(d), 8.9(d), Int’l Organization for 
Standardization (2016).  The International Standards Organization suggests that anti-
retaliation provisions be extended to cover an employee’s refusal, in good faith or on a 
reasonable basis, to engage in an activity where there is more than a low risk of bribery that 
has not been adequately mitigated by the company, even if the refusal results in a loss of 
business.  See ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management Systems — Requirements with 
Guidance for Use §§ 5.2.1(l), 7.2.2.1(d), Int’l Organization for Standardization (2016).  
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allegations of misconduct and documenting the response, including 
disciplinary or remedial measures.127  Enforcement authorities 
emphasize that companies should use internal investigations as an 
opportunity to learn from experience and update the company’s 
compliance program as appropriate.128   
I. Continuous Improvement and Periodic Testing and Review
Enforcement authorities emphasize the importance of 
continuously reviewing and improving a compliance program to 
address weaknesses or risks exposed through periodic risk 
assessments, testing, audits, investigations, and changes in a 
company’s area of operation, the nature of the customers, applicable 
laws, and industry standards.129   
Companies committed to improvement make “thoughtful efforts 
to create a sustainable compliance program if a problem is later 
discovered,” and address risk areas before they become violations.130  
Companies can use employee surveys, risk assessments, control 
testing, and internal audits to identify new risks or weaknesses in 
internal controls, although the nature and frequency of evaluations 
can appropriately vary depending on the size, complexity and risk 
127. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 61; Dept. of Justice, Evaluation of
Corporate Compliance Programs 5 (2017); Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act 2010: 
Guidance § 6.2 (2010); ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management Systems — 
Requirements with Guidance for Use §§ A.18.1, A.18.3, Int’l Organization for 
Standardization (2016).  The International Standards Organization recommends that 
companies focus during investigations on, among other things, applicable local law, the risk 
of defamation, the protection of individuals making reports, potential criminal and civil 
liability, and any legal obligations or benefits related to reporting investigations to 
authorities.  See ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management Systems — Requirements with 
Guidance for Use § A.18.6, Int’l Organization for Standardization (2016). 
128. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 61; Good Practice Guidance on
Internal Controls, Ethics, and Compliance § 11(iii), Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (Feb.18, 2010); Dept. of Justice, Evaluation of Corporate Compliance 
Programs 5 (2017) (suggesting that companies are expected to undertake a root cause 
analysis for substantiated instances of misconduct); ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery 
Management Systems — Requirements with Guidance for Use § A.18.8, Int’l Organization 
for Standardization (2016) (recommending that companies implement follow-up procedures 
for anti-bribery investigations, including appropriate disciplinary action; repaying or 
reclaiming any improper benefit obtained as a result of misconduct; terminating, 
withdrawing from or modifying the organization’s involvement in a project, transaction or 
contract; reporting a matter to the authorities; or, if bribery has occurred, taking action to 
avoid or deal with possible consequent legal offenses). 
129. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 58–62; Ministry of Justice, The
Bribery Act 2010: Guidance §§ 6.1–6.4 (2010); ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management 
Systems — Requirements with Guidance for Use § 10.1, Int’l Organization for 
Standardization (2016).   
130. FCPA Resource Guide supra note 81, at 62.
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profile of the organization.131 
IV. GAPS AND CONTINUED AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT IN THE IOC’S
PROGRAM
Despite the improvements to its compliance program, the IOC is
still quite vulnerable to the risks of corruption.  Indeed, recent 
allegations of corruption in the IOC have once again called into 
question the organization’s commitment to ethics and integrity.132  
For example, French authorities announced an investigation of the 
awards for the 2016 and 2020 Summer Olympic Games due to 
allegations that the Japanese Olympic Committee used a consultant to 
provide up to two million dollars to Lamine Diack, the former 
President of the International Association of Athletics Federation, in 
exchange for votes.133  
Reviewing the IOC’s compliance program in light of 
international best practices, there are still gaps in the IOC’s policies 
that may provide opportunities for misconduct.  This Article now 
examines the gaps in the IOC’s program and the areas in which there 
is room for improvement. 
A. Membership Selection
The IOC acts through its members – at the annual Session – and 
thus, the selection of members is significant to the operation of the 
organization.  There are both substantive and procedural issues that 
can be improved with respect to member selection – with the goals of 
improving quality and increasing transparency. 
131. See id.; Dept. of Justice, Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs 6 (2017);
Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act 2010: Guidance § 6.2 (2010); ISO 37001:2016 Anti-
Bribery Management Systems — Requirements with Guidance for Use § 9.3.1, Int’l 
Organization for Standardization (2016) (setting forth areas for top management to examine 
to evaluate the effectiveness of a company’s compliance program). 
132. See, e.g., Sean Ingle, Tokyo Olympic Games corruption claims bring scandal back
to the IOC, THE GUARDIAN (May 11, 2016, 10:58 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2016/may/11/tokyo-olympic-games-2020-ioc-
international-olympic-committee-corruption-bid-scandal. 
133. See Gerard Bon, France Extends Corruption Probe to Olympic Bids Process,
REUTERS (Mar. 1, 2016, 5:22 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-athletics-corruption-
olympics-idUSKCN0W356P; Justin McCurry & Owen Gibson, Tokyo Olympics: Japan to 
“Fully Cooperate” with Suspicious Payments Inquiry, THE GUARDIAN (May 16, 2016, 7:48 
AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/16/tokyo-olympics-japan-vows-to-
fully-cooperate-with-suspicious-payments-inquiry.   
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At the moment, there are no term limits for IOC members.134  
And although IOC members cannot serve past age seventy, the age 
restriction can be waived by the Session upon the recommendation of 
the Executive Board.135  The Olympic Agenda 2020 noted the wide 
latitude granted the Session to waive the age limit and recommended 
that the exception be applied in a maximum of five cases at a given 
time.136  The IOC already adopted the recommendation regarding 
waiver of the age limit,137 which is a step in the right direction.  The 
IOC should also implement term limits for its members.  Corporate 
governance best practices include term limits for board members to 
avoid apathy, to facilitate the removal of non-performing or poor 
performing members, and to bring in fresh talent and ideas to a board. 
The Olympic Agenda 2020 also recommended that the then-
Nominations Commission take a more active role in identifying 
candidates to ensure that the Session contains an adequate balance in 
terms of skill, knowledge and geography.138  The Member Evaluation 
Commission was charged with proposing a new targeted recruitment 
process for IOC members.139  Currently, the members are essentially 
self-selected by the IOC Elections Commission; candidates submit a 
CV, a “motivation letter,” and must be sponsored by three IOC 
members.140  It is not a particularly transparent or representative 
process.  The IOC should consider greater transparency in the 
nominations as well in the qualifications sought for its members. 
B. Additional Due Diligence and Vetting
In addition to membership selection requirements, the IOC 
134.  See Int’l Olympic Comm., IOC Members Election Commission, 
https://www.olympic.org/ioc-members-election-commission (last visited Jan. 22, 2017). 
135. Int’l Olympic Comm., Olympic Charter Rule 16.1, 16.3 at 37 (effective Aug. 2,
2016), https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/General/EN-
Olympic-Charter.pdf#_ga=1.48953187.415998738.1485096175. 
136. Int’l Olympic Comm., Olympic Agenda 2020: 20+20 Recommendations (2014),
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/Documents/Olympic
-Agenda-2020/Olympic-Agenda-2020-20-20-
Recommendations.pdf#_ga=1.48429027.415998738.1485096175.
137. Int’l Olympic Comm., Olympic Charter Rule 16.1 at 37 (effective Aug. 2, 2016),
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/General/EN-
Olympic-Charter.pdf#_ga=1.48953187.415998738.1485096175.   
138. Int’l Olympic Comm., Olympic Agenda 2020: 20+20 Recommendations (2014),
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/Documents/Olympic
-Agenda-2020/Olympic-Agenda-2020-20-20-
Recommendations.pdf#_ga=1.48429027.415998738.1485096175.
139.  Int’l Olympic Comm., IOC Members Election Commission, 
https://www.olympic.org/ioc-members-election-commission (last visited Jan. 22, 2017). 
140. Id.
7_FINAL_BENITEZ (DO NOT DELETE) 11/6/2017  2:17 PM 
2017] INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE CORRUPTION 183 
should consider additional requirements and due diligence 
surrounding the character and fitness of IOC members.  For example, 
the IOC can use the Ethics Commission to conduct additional due 
diligence and vetting.  As officials in a position of public trust, IOC 
members should not be subject to convictions or findings suggesting 
failures in their ethics and integrity.  Further, the IOC should consider 
temporary suspensions for members subject to investigations calling 
a member’s character or fitness into question; allowing those 
members to cast votes for the selection of the host city can cast doubt 
on the propriety of the process, especially if the investigations 
eventually lead to sanctions.  For instance, the list of current, former, 
and honorary IOC members still includes individuals involved in the 
FIFA scandal, prompting many to suggest that the French 
investigation into the selection of the 2016 and 2020 Olympic Games 
may be well-founded.141   
C. Internal Controls
The IOC should consider additional policies and procedures to 
increase transparency and tighten internal controls.  For example, the 
IOC should set limits on expenditures and travel, and designate 
individuals who are required to approve such expenses depending on 
various thresholds.  In addition, the IOC should take a close look at 
potential conflicts of interest which are likely to arise in the context 
of selecting host cities.  The IOC should consider requiring disclosure 
of potential conflicts to the Ethics Commission and certifications of 
assets and income updated annually or as needed.   
D. Training
Another area for increased investment may be additional 
training for IOC members.  Although the Ethics and Compliance 
Office has educational duties, little information exists on formal 
training requirements for IOC members regarding their ethical and 
professional responsibilities.142  At a minimum, IOC members should 
141. See Sean Ingle, Tokyo Olympic Games Corruption Claims Bring Scandal Back to
IOC, THE GUARDIAN (May 11, 2016, 10:58 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2016/may/11/tokyo-olympic-games-2020-ioc-
international-olympic-committee-corruption-bid-scandal (citing Lamine Diack, mentioned 
above as the potential recipient of two million dollars from the Japanese NOC in exchange 
for votes; Sepp Blatter, the former, disgraced president of FIFA; Issa Hayatou, accused of 
taking $1.5 million to support Qatar’s bid for the World Cup; and Sheikh Ahmad al-Fahad 
al-Sabah, accused of using the Olympic Council of Asia to buy votes). 
 142.  Int’l Olympic Comm., Ethics Commission: Decisions, 
https://www.olympic.org/ethics-commission (last visited Jan. 22, 2017). 
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annually certify that they have read the Code of Ethics.  In addition, 
the IOC should consider implementing a periodic training program 
regarding ethics that includes specific situations that IOC members 
may encounter.  The training should be tailored to the situations that 
IOC members actually face when interacting with candidate cities, 
vendors, or sponsors. 
E.  Gifts   
Since IOC members are permitted to receive “gifts of nominal 
value” when culturally appropriate,143 the IOC should consider a 
policy requiring members to document such gifts because it would 
provide information regarding the cultures and geographies where 
gift giving is expected with respect to members’ IOC responsibilities.  
Similarly, IOC members should be required to disclose improper 
solicitations or offers of gifts to the Ethics and Compliance Office.   
F.  Enforcement and Initiation of Investigations   
Even with new procedures, there has been a lack of robust 
enforcement at the IOC.  In the last three years, there have been only 
two final decisions of the Ethics Commission: one reinstating a 
previously suspended member and another suspending a member for 
plagiarism.144  There has been no enforcement for misconduct in any 
other areas during this period.145  The last findings related to 
corruption were in 2011, in which the IOC issued a reprimand to Issa 
Hayatou—who remains a member—and a warning to Lamine Diack 
for accepting payments from a marketing partner of FIFA as 
President of the African Football Confederation.146  Stricter discipline 
against those individuals may have protected the IOC from recent 
allegations.  As noted above, Mr. Diack is the target of a French 
investigation of alleged payments made by the Japanese NOC in 
 
 143.  Int’l Olympic Comm., 2022 Candidature Procedure and Questionnaire, 
https://stillmed.olympic.org/Documents/Host_city_elections/FINAL_2022_Candidature_Pro
cedure_and_Questionnaire-FINAL.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2017). 
 144.  Int’l Olympic Comm., Ethics Commission: Decisions, supra note 130.  
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Int’l Olympic Comm., Ethics Commission Decision with Recommendation 
N°D/02/2011 (Oct. 3, 2011), 
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/IOC/Who-We-
Are/Commissions/Ethics/Decisions/EN-Decision-N-02-11-dated-03-10-
2011.pdf#_ga=1.2175093.415998738.1485096175; Int’l Olympic Comm., Ethics 
Commission Decision with Recommendation N°D/01/2011 (Oct. 3, 2011), 
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/IOC/Who-We-
Are/Commissions/Ethics/Decisions/EN-Decision-N-01-11-dated-03-10-
2011.pdf#_ga=1.178698340.1118399489.1487368123.   
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exchange for votes, and Mr. Hayatou is the subject of allegations 
related to the FIFA corruption scandal.147 
Enforcement authorities may view the failure to implement 
discipline consistently as a fatal deficiency in an otherwise effective 
compliance program.  A lack of discipline can be perceived as the 
product of a weak commitment to ethical issues from senior 
leadership, structural problems with reporting within the 
organization, or the result of under-developed compliance 
investigation and audit resources.   
In order to have more robust enforcement, the IOC should 
consider broadening the manner in which investigations may be 
initiated.  Under the current system, only the IOC President or the 
Ethics Commission can initiate proceedings.148  It is worth 
considering the creation of a separate audit or investigative office that 
is independent of both the Ethics Commission and the Ethics and 
Compliance Office and that can commence investigations on its own.  
This would also increase the IOC’s internal investigations capacity to 
ensure that matters were handled by experienced investigators.  
Relatedly, the IOC’s external audit is currently limited to finances;149 
it should consider an external audit for compliance controls. 
Although the IOC has an ethics hotline, the pace of enforcement 
suggests that it has not been an effective tool for identifying potential 
misconduct.150  This may be because the hotline may not have been 
adequately publicized or there may also be some concern in using it.  
The IOC should create a separate confidentiality and non-retaliation 
policy to encourage use of the ethics hotline and consultation with the 
Ethics and Compliance Office.   
G. Risk Assessments
The Ethics and Compliance Office – or a separate audit or 
investigative office – should be equipped to conduct regular risk 
assessments to ensure that the compliance program is effective.  This 
can be particularly significant and necessary when there are bids from 
147. Id.
148.  Int’l Olympic Comm., IOC Members Election Commission, 
https://www.olympic.org/ioc-members-election-commission (last visited Jan. 22, 2017). 
149. Int’l Olympic Comm., Audit Committee, https://www.olympic.org/audit-committee
(last visited Jan. 22, 2017). 
150.  See Int’l Olympic Comm., Ethics Commission: Decisions, 
https://www.olympic.org/ethics-commission (last visited Jan. 22, 2017). 
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countries that have a high perception of corruption.151  It is 
insufficient to develop a compliance program and allow it to become 
stale; it must be tested and verified to help the organization mitigate 
corruption risks. 
H. Use of Independent Monitors
Another factor to consider is the use of independent monitors.  
While monitors have often been required by U.S. enforcement 
authorities as part of an agreement to settle corruption charges, some 
entities, and even governments, have used monitors in a proactive 
manner.  For example, South Korea has implemented government 
monitoring to oversee spending related to the 2018 Olympic 
Games.152  The appointment of a credible and independent monitor to 
assist with specific issues or projects is an idea worth considering.  
While some may be deterred by the investment of resources at the 
front end, an effective monitor could not only assist in preventing 
corruption, but could be a helpful tool in reducing costs overall.  
Moreover, a monitor can be helpful in protecting against reputational 
risks.   
CONCLUSION 
The failure to award the Olympic Games to a viable host city is 
potentially an existential threat to the IOC.  Such a result would run 
counter to the IOC’s fundamental mission of protecting and 
promoting the Olympic Games, and it would impair revenues through 
an entire Olympiad.  The IOC has made considerable progress 
updating its organization and installing a compliance program, and 
the organization should be commended for the actions taken in the 
wake of the Salt Lake City bribery scandal and, more recently, as a 
result of the Olympic Agenda 2020.  Despite those gains, the IOC 
should stay vigilant for additional opportunities to close potential 
gaps and strengthen its ethics and compliance program.  The IOC’s 
resolve to stamp out corruption should be grounded in both its moral 
commitment to good governance and fair competition and the sheer 
economic importance of managing the Olympic Games responsibly 
and free of corruption.  With some changes to its anti-corruption 
151. See Corruption Perceptions Index 2016, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL,
http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016 (last visited 
Jan. 22, 2017). 
152. See Laura Tulchin, To Clean Up Big-Time Sports Events, Start With Monitors,
FCPA BLOG (Feb. 1, 2017, 9:18 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2017/2/1/laura-
tulchin-to-clean-up-big-time-sports-events-start-with.html#sthash.rMOH5pKQ.dpuf. 
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program, the IOC could more successfully accomplish that mission. 
